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 The economics of humanitarian
aid: Are we on a slippery slope?
Could the current modalities of humanitarian
aid to refugees be improved? Dr. Stephanie
Levy argues for more creative aid agreements
to form the backbone of the global response
to the current refugee crisis.
At the World Humanitarian Summit (WH Summit), David Miliband, head
of the International Rescue Committee, announced that 25% all of all IRC
interventions will be ‘cash based distributions’ by 2020, arguing that ‘cash
transfers work both in empowering people and in driving local economic
development’.
Newly pledged aid agreements should account for the
economic impact of cash transfers
‘Just give them the money’ is an often quoted prescription by
development economists working in the field of social
protection and humanitarian crisis. It has been used quite
intensively in the current debate on how to effectively support
refugees during this recent wave of migration and conflict. In
fact, the benefits of cash transfers (CTs) in humanitarian
contexts are well documented and there seems to be a consensus
emerging (Baily & Harvey 2015) in the current debate around
the use of these interventions to provide immediate assistance to
refugee populations, in refugee camps in particular. The WH
Summit was a testament to the growing commitment by
governments, NGOs and practitioners to support this form of
aid delivery.
At the same time, unprecedented aid agreements with MENA
hosting countries are being signed, promising substantial
financial support, part of which is supposedly aimed at covering
the refugee population’s subsistence needs. In February, nearly
$12 billion of new aid was pledged at the Donor Conference in
London to support Syrian refugees.
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Syrian refugees in the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan, located 10 km east of Mafraq,
Jordan on 27 March 2016.
Image credit: World Bank Photo Collection, Dominic Chavez
This could be seen as good news for both refugees and their
hosting countries. There are however important reasons to
question the economic impact that both CTs and substantial aid
flows could have on the economy of refugee hosting countries,
and more particularly on the livelihoods of people living in and
around the refugee camps. While we have little evidence on the
potential impact of these flows on the economy around the
refugee camps, existing research and economic lessons from
past aid experience could be reviewed and analysed to offer
concrete recommendations for an efficient use of these
resources.
Aid, like oil, can distort local markets
A large body of evidence has been established for two decades
around the distortions that large aid flows could generate. So
called ‘Dutch Disease’ effects, involving increases in real
exchange rates, domestic inflation and economic growth
slowdown have been well documented and analysed by
economists. So much so, that aid has been compared to oil
(Collier, 2005) for its potential effects on domestic economies
and prices. This is in addition to the political impact of
worsening inequalities and increasing social fragmentation.
Similarly, the issue of cash transfer impacts on the local
economy and on prices in particular, should be questioned
(Levy 2015). In a study of the general equilibrium impact of
social protection in Cambodia, Robinson and Levy (2014)
found that the surge in demand for consumption by CT
recipients could lead to an increase in prices when a) markets
are remote and isolated and trade does not regulate price
efficiently and b) there is insufficient supply elasticity and
capacity to adjust to the increase in demand. Other studies have
similarly provided evidence of the potential risks of local price
increases resulting from the distribution of cash transfers. Such
price effects have been found in Mexico for example, where the
development of markets and productive sectors are expected to
be more advanced and well able to respond to increases in
household demand.
Furthermore, the arguments in favour of CTs as a stimulus for
the local economy, i.e. using cash to solve credit market
imperfections or promote local economy, do not apply in the
context of refugee camps. Refugees are almost exclusively
dependent on the cash they receive for survival. They are legally
restricted from working in the hosting country, and risk losing
their refugee status if they do. In practice however, refugees
constitute a potentially cheaper labour force that is sometimes
used informally, and often under appalling working conditions.
Accounting for local market’s capacity and regional trade
So research and existing evidence on both large aid flows and
cash transfers led us to question the potential economic impact
of the migrant crisis on hosting countries if aid agreements are
kept in their current forms. It may be the case that the local
capacity to absorb both large humanitarian aid flows and CTs
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“
capacity to absorb both large humanitarian aid flows and CTs
is better among Middle East & North African (MENA)
countries, compared to countries with less economic capacity,
lower productivity and technology, less market integration and,
especially, less dynamic trade. If so, concerns about inflation
and economic slowdown might be seen as less relevant (Barder,
2015). But it may also not be the case that their economy and
productive capacity is not as robust what is needed to absorb
large economic shocks.
So when supply and demand are supported
simultaneously, the local economy is better off ”
Given that humanitarian aid pledged to hosting countries is
substantial, as is the size of the refugee population (1.1 million
refugees are currently live among 4.2 million Lebanese
nationals), the potential for economic distortions must be
carefully considered. For the interest of the hosting country’s
population as well as the refugees, whose livelihoods depend on
these transfers and local market prices. Economic slowdown
and inflation also risk fuelling political demands and rejection
of the refugee population in host countries, potentially adding
to existing instability in the region.
While we know a lot about potential inflation risks and the
‘resource curse’, we also know about potential ‘remedies’.
 Regarding aid, research has shown that price increases and
economic slowdown can be avoided when public revenues are
used strategically to finance public investment in productive
sectors, support productivity gains, improve access to
education, training and social services, and develop domestic
infrastructure.
Similarly the impact of cash transfers on the local economy is
likely to be improved when complemented by productive
investment and interventions that enhance factor’s productivity,
improve the functioning of markets and support the local
supply. The findings of our study on Cambodia, for example,
suggest that when CTs are distributed and local supply can be
supported by public investment, local production can keep pace
with increased demand without driving up prices. So when
supply and demand are supported simultaneously, the local
economy is better off, while poverty can be significantly
reduced at the lowest part of the income distribution. For a
given amount of public spending, a mix of CTs and productive
public investment may work better than either of the two
measures adopted in isolation.
Rethinking aid: Creative agreements are needed to
mitigate political and economic risks
So, assuming that there are possible risks associated with large
aid flows and CT distributions, aid agreements in their current
form may not be sufficient to guarantee full economic benefits
to refugee hosting countries and to protect political stability in
the midst of a migration crisis. New models of aid cooperation
could be designed on the basis of what has proven to stimulate
the economy of recipient governments and the livelihoods of
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their population. If such models were implemented, refugees
could even become economic assets for MENA countries. For
donor’s resources to be used wisely and efficiently, aid
agreements could involve:
1. Free economic zones and free trade agreements: integrating these
into aid deals would allow host countries to access new donors,
beyond Europe with adjustments to trade policies. Decreasing
tariffs for specific goods and services that have been produced by
hosting countries with a ‘refugee’ labour content would be
another efficient policy that could help both integrate refugee
populations and stimulate the domestic economy of hosting
countries.
2. Budgeted support for the financing of public investment and
development of domestic infrastructure: as per our macro-
economic analysis in Cambodia, there are clear gains to
supporting trade and market functionality. Public investments
can help offset the threats or risks of both aid and CT
distribution, ensuring they result in a net gain to the local
economy. Similar results have been found in the context of the
resource curse (Barder 2006, Levy 2006).
3. Working permits for refugees: this would allow refugees to
improve their livelihoods by starting to invest, produce, and
contribute to the local economy where they live. The economic
gains would be especially high for skilled labour. Engineers,
doctors, teachers are to be found among refugees, who often
don’t come empty handed’.
4. Social support services: direct and targeted budget support,
financing of improved access to social services in health and
education for populations in and around the refugee camps. Such
measures would support labour productivity gains while directly
benefiting the local population, improving their livelihoods and
future economic prospects.
Regulation is needed to protect vulnerable populations
Working permits and special trade zones would both need to be
regulated and closely supervised, to protect a highly vulnerable
refugee labour force from exploitation and abuse. Previous
experience of Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) agreements
between the US and Middle Eastern countries led to appalling
working conditions for migrant workers in the garment
industry. Migrants were typically overworked, underpaid, and
prohibited from joining trade unions. Working permits for
refugees would need to be governed by the same labour
regulations as in hosting countries to prevent creation of an
exploited labour force – as we can see already happening in
Turkey’s textile industry, where children provide informal
labour and work under appalling conditions and for wages well
below local standards.
While local hosting populations currently see refugees as
potential threats to their own employment, measures 1, 2, and
4 could modify their perception of temporary working permits.
Financial support to Syria’s neighbours, hosting refugees, is
undeniably needed, but there are clear economic justifications
to design creative aid agreements that would mitigate economic
and political risks. The above suggestions offer options for
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and political risks. The above suggestions offer options for
improving the impact of aid flows and cash distribution to
refugees. Given the magnitude of the current crisis, the stakes
are immense for the host countries as well as for millions of
refugees, for stability of the region and for donors who are
buying the containment of migration to their own land. Donors
are already losing the battle on the duty to assist; a failure to
manage this crisis could now compromise their own political
stability.
